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CONDITIONALITY AS OPPOSED TO INSEVERABILITY
Tom Campbell∗
Eric Fish has given us a most engaging defense of a proposal to allow
severability of statutes in almost all cases. In comparison with the current
Supreme Court standard, Fish argues that he does not have courts engage in the
difficult task of interpreting congressional intent. Instead, he would allow
severability as the default, with only very limited exceptions where the
legislative branch has indicated inseverability. Fish gives us four such
indicators: 1) an inseverabilty clause, 2) where the text becomes nonsensical as
a result of the severing, 3) where what’s left of the statute cannot be enforced,
and 4) where what’s left “serves no plausible purpose.”1 Other authors who
favor severability, Fish claims, have not limited the instances of inseverability
as much as he has.2 “The main benefit of the conditionality theory,” Fish
maintains, “is that it limits the incidence of judges reasoning like legislatures.”3
Of course, the best way to prevent judges from acting as legislators is to
prevent them from treating something that was not passed by the legislature as
law. The only way to do that, with one hundred percent certainty, is to follow a
rule of inseverability, which I advocated in my article, Severability of Statutes,4
to which Mr. Fish offers some critical attention. So, if the “main benefit” truly
is to constrain judges, inseverability wins over severability every time. With
inseverability, the court voids a statute, and Congress gets to legislate anew.
As to Fish’s claim of being novel, other authors who favor severability5 can
undertake to dissect how different his approach is to theirs. Fish claims he is
unique because “none of these [other authors] have explored the possibility of
implicit inseverability.”6 However, when these other commentators, and the
Supreme Court itself, ask whether the Congress would have wished to see the
remnant of a statute continue in force after the unconstitutional part was

∗ Dean and Donald P. Kennedy Professor of Law, and Professor of Economics, Dale E. Fowler School
of Law, Chapman University.
1 Eric S. Fish, Severability as Conditionality, 64 EMORY L.J. 1293, 1343 (2015).
2 Id. at 1323.
3 Id. at 1298.
4 Tom Campbell, Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011).
5 See Fish, supra note 1, at 1296–97 & nn.10–11.
6 Id. at 1333 n.139.
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severed, they are engaged in searching for implicit inseverability. Fish
denigrates this undertaking as a court “putting itself in Congress’s place and
imagining whether Congress would have wanted to keep the remainder of the
statute.”7 However, Fish does allow a court to ask if a statute, after being
severed, is nonsensical, unenforceable, or serving no plausible purpose—three
of the four bases Fish prescribes for implicit inseverability. That is not much
different from asking if Congress intended a result that is nonsensical,
unenforceable, or serving no plausible purpose. Indeed, when he presses
himself to find cases where his outcome would be different from the current
jurisprudence that does ask about hypothetical congressional intent, Fish finds
no statutory cases, and only one Executive Order instance that might.8 Fish
finds it a virtue of his approach that it is so closely congruent to decided cases.
One might suggest it is for that very reason not so novel.
Can one imagine a case where the severed remnant of a statute is sensible,
enforceable, and serves a plausible purpose but should nevertheless not be
allowed to stand without the part that was severed? That is what one would
have to posit to criticize Fish’s approach on a policy ground, and I have a very
good example: Buckley v. Valeo.9 Congress passed limits on campaign
expenditures and campaign contributions. The Court struck down the limits on
campaign expenditures. The result has created a plutocracy in our country:
wealthy candidates can fund their own campaigns; less wealthy candidates are
limited to raising money from others, under per donor caps. No one in
Congress voted for such a system.
That Fish’s approach would uphold the outcome of creating a campaign
system that Congress never intended and did not pass is not a high
recommendation.10
Leaving the question of whether it is a virtue to ignore congressional intent
when the remnant of a statute results in an outcome Congress did not wish, is
Fish internally consistent in claiming he does, in fact, ignore congressional
intent under his test? He claims superiority for his approach over the
hypothetical intent test because “[t]he hypothetical intent theory thus devolves
into imaginative reconstruction. . . . The hypothetical intent approach
7

Id. at 1323.
See id. at 1347–58.
9 424 U.S. 1, 7, 108–09 (1976) (per curiam).
10 However, to be fair, the Court didn’t get it right either. It was a classic case for inseverability, based on
congressional intent analysis but the majority didn’t so rule. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion argued for
inseverability. See id. at 254–55 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
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effectively makes a court a kind of replacement Congress, telling judges to get
into the heads of legislators and decide what they would have wanted to
repeal.”11
Actually, his approach is not so pure. Here are four of many examples of
his inconsistency.
1. In criticizing the holding in Mille Lacs, Fish tells us “the Court at least
framed the inquiry properly—the question was whether President Taylor
intended the two parts of the order to stand or fall together.”12 How can Fish
maintain he does not get courts into the business of ascertaining intent when
the “proper inquiry,” in his view, is whether the author of the law (here, an
executive order), “intended” it?
2. Fish would send a federal court on a search through the entire U.S.
Code to determine if other provisions of law, perhaps years apart in when they
passed, were nevertheless so linked in effect to an unconstitutional provision of
the law before the court, that they, too, should be struck down. Why is that the
correct approach? “[B]ecause Congress often intends provisions to work in
concert even where it does not enact them as part of the same bill or act.”13
3. In his hypothetical of a sculpture of Moses erected with public money,
on top of a pedestal, Fish argues for striking down the inoffensive pedestal
because “the pedestal is so clearly intended only to support the statue.”14
4. In applying his test to Williams v. Standard Oil, Fish invites an inquiry
into legislative intent parallel to analyzing an employer’s motives in an
employment discrimination case: “In deciding whether the [remaining] . . .
provision is conditional on the rest of the statute [that was struck down], judges
would have to determine whether legislators actually had that independent
purpose in mind when they enacted the statute.”15
Judicial inquiry into legislative “purpose” and legislative “intent” is
positively rife in Fish’s examples! By his own admission, Fish’s theory of
“implied conditionality seems perilously close to an inquiry into hypothetical
congressional intent.”16
11
12
13
14
15
16

Fish, supra note 1, at 1323–24.
Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1340 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1341 n.159 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1341.
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So, if implied conditionality is what sets Fish’s analysis apart from other
authors who defend severability, by his own admission, and implied
conditionality encompasses analysis of intent, by his own examples, Fish must
lose his claim to having a theory that is both different in kind and superior to
other advocates of severability. Perhaps he looks into legislative intent, but just
a little less frequently than they.
Further, if avoiding the exercise of divining hypothetical legislative intent
is a virtue, how can Fish’s approach hold a candle to inseverability?
Inseverability absolutely abstracts from congressional intent. If a clause in a
bill passed by Congress is unconstitutional, the bill is void. That is what I
advocate. Inseverability is so simple. What passed Congress was one set of
words. If a part of those words is eliminated, what is left did not pass
Congress. So it is not valid law. Under inseverability, there is no need to
investigate or hypothesize about intent. Judges are never asked to legislate. It is
a superior approach to Fish’s, on exactly the criteria he sets as important.
Nevertheless, Fish has two criticisms of my approach.
First, Fish argues that the burden would be excessive on Congress to have
to reconsider an entire bill that passed Congress because part was
unconstitutional. “It would overburden Congress to force it to periodically
reenact such massive laws, and given the realities of partisanship and
legislative inertia, such reenactments could take a long time or not happen at
all.”17
However, elsewhere in his article, Fish has no problem with giving such a
burden to Congress. Fish admits that severability will often result in mangled
laws, “statutory distortion,”18 which is “[t]he main cost of the conditionality
theory.”19 His cure is that, following a court holding part of a law
17 Id. at 1315. To the point that Congress might never get around to reenacting a law if it were struck
down, I observe Fish has a bias toward one Congress over another. Congress A passed a law that was
unconstitutional. Under inseverability, the law dies. Congress B decides it is not important to attempt to pass a
new version of that law. The world reverts to where it was before Congress A acted. A priori, I cannot say that
is a worse world than a world in which only part of what Congress A passed continues to be the law. Fish
makes frequent reference to the Affordable Care Act, concerned that if inseverability had been applied, there
would be no new law left at all. That betrays a perfectly understandable, but overtly policy-based prejudgment,
that America is better off with some part of the Affordable Care Act than it was before 2010 when the act was
passed. Suppose we were speaking of the Patriot Act, and the Court had struck down the portion allowing
warrantless searches. Would Fish be happy or sad that the rest of the Patriot Act would be allowed to continue
in force?
18 Id. at 1309–13, 1348.
19 Id. at 1348.
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unconstitutional, and severing it while the rest continues, Congress can come
back and fix any awkward consequences that have resulted.20 Fish realizes that,
unless Congress comes back and fixes the court’s work, there could be
“negative consequences” that would “undermine the law’s purpose.”21
Citing Professor Eskridge’s research, Fish notes that “[f]rom 1967 to 2011,
275 Supreme Court opinions have been overridden by Congress.”22 This works
out to 6.25 congressional rewrites per year. Fish is comfortable with this
workload upon Congress. However, an embarrassing artifact of Fish’s appeal
to Congress to fix the imperfection of severability is that it undermines his first
criticism of inseverability. To one willing to have Congress consider 6.25 laws
a year because Congress disagreed with the Court’s statutory construction, how
burdensome is it to ask Congress to reconsider as well those laws that have
been struck down as unconstitutional by the Court? We can actually calculate
the answer.
From the adoption of the U.S. Constitution to 2005, the Supreme Court has
held 165 federal statutes unconstitutional, an average of less than once a year.23
Most of these have been after the beginning of the twentieth century.
Measuring from 1900 to 2005, the Court has held 137 statutes unconstitutional,
or an average of four every three years. And measuring from West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,24 the modern era when the U.S. Supreme Court no longer
applied Lochner v. New York,25 ninety statutes were overturned in seventy-five
years, six laws every five years, barely more than one statute per year.
Asking Congress to reconsider just over one more statute a year is not
demonstrably burdensome when Congress is already reconsidering six.
The best illustration Fish has for his position about the burden
inseverability would impose on Congress comes from INS v. Chadha,26 the
case which struck down the legislative veto that at the time existed in 196
different statutes. However, if instead of holding the legislative veto
20

Id. (“Congress can amend or repeal a statute that has been partially invalidated.”).
Id.
22 Id. (citing Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1328–29 (2014)).
23 See Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court of the United
States, JUSTIA, http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/046-acts-of-congress-held-unconstitutional.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2015).
24 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
25 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26 462 U.S. 919, 944, 959 (1983); see also Fish, supra note 1, at 1314.
21
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unconstitutional, the Court had simply interpreted it in way that Congress
thought caused “statutory distortion,” Fish would be happy having Congress
review all 196 statutes to undo the distortion. Suppose, for instance, that the
Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that Congress really meant a
two-house veto rather than a one-house veto in all those instances. The burden
on Congress of going back through all those laws and making clear its intent
for a one-house veto would be identical, yet Fish would approve it.
So the congressional burden disadvantage has to be borne by Fish as much
as by me.27
Fish might still maintain that fixing some parts of a statute is easier work
for Congress than passing an entire statute again. That depends, of course, on
the size and complexity of the statute in question. Even with large statutes,
however, whole sections of a law would likely pass again without much
controversy—as has quite frequently happened in recent years when Congress
has voted on sequential continuing budget resolutions to fund thousands of
government agencies for a month, or a week, at a time.
The second criticism Fish offers of my approach is that my view requires
“constructing a constitutional metaphysics of statutes in which a bill is an atom
of law that cannot be divided. One could do so by interpreting bicameralism
and presentment to make bills into unbreakable units, but the features of the
legislative process do not compel that interpretation.”28 He continues in the
footnote:
In defending his formalism, Campbell draws an analogy to the
line-item veto: the President cannot choose which parts of a bill he
vetoes, and so the courts cannot choose which parts of a bill they
strike down. But this analogy does not hold. The line item veto is
invalid because the Presentment Clause requires that the President
accept or reject a bill in toto during its passage, not because bills are
inherently indivisible once Congress approves them. Judges can
strike down part of an enacted bill without affecting the rest of it, just

27 In truth, Chadha is unique. Fish cites no other instance of a clause so ubiquitous in statutes that was
either held unconstitutional (his case against my approach) or was misinterpreted by the Court (my case
against his approach). However, whatever the burden, his approach cannot escape it as long as he advocates
congressional action to remedy the statutory distortion caused by severability.
28 Fish, supra note 1, at 1315–16.
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as Congress can repeal part of an enacted bill while leaving the rest in
place.29

Actually, Congress cannot “repeal part of an enacted bill while leaving the
rest in place.” The President would have to sign such a repeal; and that, of
course, would be a new law following all the procedures of bicameralism and
presentment. A law is needed to change a law.
Further, Clinton v. City of New York, to which Fish refers in the above
passage, overwhelmingly supports the logic of inseverability. Here is the quote
from Clinton on which I relied in my article,
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 . . . became “Public Law 105-33”
after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill containing its exact
text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of
Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the same text; and
(3) that text was signed into law by the President. The Constitution
explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken before a bill
may “become a law.” If one paragraph of that text had been omitted
at any one of those three stages, Public Law 105-33 would not have
been validly enacted. . . . Something that might be known as “Public
Law 105-33 as modified by the President” may or may not be
desirable, but it is surely not a document that may “become a law”
pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers of Article I, §7,
of the Constitution.30

The Supreme Court in Clinton said that a bill “containing its exact text”
had to be approved by each of the two houses of Congress, and by the
President, for it to become law.31 What resulted from the use of the line-item
veto had not been the “exact text” that passed each house. So also, a bill that
has part of its excised by the Court under the severability doctrine is not the
“exact text” that passed each house.
Fish attempts to distinguish this syllogism by saying the formalism of an
exact text passing both houses and receiving the President’s signature only
deals with creating a law. Thereafter, assumedly, the law can be mangled by
some other process less than the creation of another law. He gives no instance,
however, of when that is so, except the case he is attempting to bolster: by a
Court imposing severability. A President cannot mangle a law once it is
29 Id. at 1316 n.86 (citing, in turn, Campbell, supra note 4, at 1498–99, and Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 439–41 (1998)).
30 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49 (citation omitted); see also Campbell, supra note 4, at 1498 n.7.
31 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49.
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passed; a single house of Congress cannot. The fact that Congress can repeal
the law, Fish’s attempted rebuttal, proves only that one duly enacted law can
supersede another. It says nothing about what a court can do.
Inseverability is superior to Fish’s approach for one additional reason,
which he does not address, though it was prominent in my article.32 When an
unconstitutional conclusion results from the interplay of different sections of a
law, the cure through severability requires judicial legislation of the clearest
kind. My example was Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board.33 The PCAOB members were appointed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, not the President, and they could not be removed
except for cause.34 Yet they exercised executive authority.35 The Court mused
that it could solve the problem of “officers of the United States” not being
answerable to the President in one of two ways. The Court said it could limit
the Board’s functions to exclude the executive parts so that PCAOB members
were no longer “officers of the United States,” since that term means officials
exercising executive powers (they would still have plenty to do in the
quasi-legislative world of rulemaking). Alternatively, the Court said it could
strike the part of the law making the PCAOB members removable only for
cause.36 The Court chose the latter approach but explicitly stated they could
have chosen the former solution.37
Inherently, severability analysis cannot deal with the Free Enterprise Fund
problem. Between two very different solutions, which should a court choose?
Inseverability, however, handles the problem very easily. The entire statute is
defeated, and Congress gets to try again.
Fish suggests it is more respectful to keep some of the legislature’s work
than to toss it all, when a subsequent legislature might not revisit the subject
matter.38 Why this favoritism for one Congress over another? One Congress
addressed a problem that seemed pressing at the time. Its effort failed,
however, because its legislative product violated the Constitution. A
subsequent Congress might not consider the same problem to be as pressing.

32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Campbell, supra note 4, at 1500–02.
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 485–86.
Id. at 508–10.
Id.
Fish, supra note 1, at 1350–51.
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“At least a partial invalidation leaves the law’s supporters with something to
build on.”39 Why is that a virtue, if the new Congress does not want the law?
Fish even gets into the specifics of the Affordable Care Act, extolling its
passage because of a unique political situation of sixty Democratic Senators, a
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, and a Democratic
President; conditions, he fears, might not recur.40 After the Supreme Court
invalidated part of the Affordable Care Act,
there was no way Congress was going to enact the ACA again—
Republicans had taken control of the House of Representatives, and
America was in the midst of a presidential election. Thus if the
Supreme Court had struck down the entire ACA because part of it
was unconstitutional, it would not just have been deciding that a
partial law was worse than no law at all. It would have been undoing
all the deliberative and political events that formed the law’s history.
This is not respectful of the democratic process.41

What is not respectful of the democratic process is for Congress to pass a
law violating the U.S. Constitution. If Congress could not count on having a
court salvage some of its work, it might be incentivized to be more careful to
abide by the Constitution in its drafting of laws in the first place.
Further, it is not respectful of the congressional process to pretend that a
bill with several parts represents the will of Congress when only parts of it
remain. Neither Fish, nor a reviewing court, can tell whether the Affordable
Care Act, minus its unconstitutional parts, represents the will of the Congress
that passed the entire bill. To assume so undoes “all the deliberative and
political events that formed” the law into the multipart document that it was. A
real respect for Congress would give to Congress the right to rebuild the
legislative product as it sees fit. That it might be a new Congress does not
make it any less the legislative branch.
To conclude:
1) Fish does not escape analysis of legislative intent. His proposal,
therefore, is not as novel as he supposes.
2) If avoiding judicial inquiry into legislative intent is a virtue,
inseverability is clearly preferable.
39
40
41

Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
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3) Inseverability imposes no greater a burden on Congress to
reconsider legislation than Fish’s approach, once he falls back on
the necessity for Congress to re-legislate following the application
of his doctrine, to prevent statutory distortion.
4) When judges allow part of a law to continue when the rest does
not, they legislate. Every version of severability has that flaw;
inseverability prevents it absolutely. This is clearest when a
statute’s unconstitutionality can be cured in one of several ways,
and the Court simply chooses one.
5) Respect for the legislative branch should not allow a law to result
in words that Congress did not approve, as opposed to giving a
new Congress a blank slate on which to legislate when a prior
Congress had failed.

